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Note
Status Update: Adapting the Stored
Communications Act to a Modern World
Jake Vandelist*
The sheer number of electronic communications users is
astounding. There were an estimated 2.9 billion email accounts
1
in 2010, and this is expected to rise to 3.8 billion by 2014. In
2012, there were 950 million worldwide active users of Face2
3
book and over 500 million worldwide Twitter users. As a result of the increased number of email and social networking users, the amount of case law involving civil discovery has
exploded. In the first six months of 2012, over three hundred
4
published civil opinions substantively involved social media.
This number almost certainly understates the volume of cases
* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2011,
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Thank you to Professor Bradley Clary, for
help in developing this topic; Ed Stockmeyer, Morgan Helme, and Grace Fleming for their insightful edits and advice on this Note; Professor Kristin Hickman for her support of the journal throughout the year; and the board and
staff of the Minnesota Law Review, for their help in editing this piece and for
all of their hard work throughout the year on Volume 98. Many thanks also to
my family and friends who have always provided me with unending support.
Copyright © 2014 by Jake Vandelist.
1. THE RADICATI GRP., INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2010, at 2 (Sara
Radicati ed., 2010), available at http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2010/04/Email-Statistics-Report-2010-2014-Executive-Summary2.pdf.
2. Associated Press, Number of Active Users at Facebook over the Years,
YAHOO FINANCE (Oct. 23, 2012, 6:04 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
number-active-users-facebook-over-years-214600186--finance.html.
3. Twitter Reaches Half a Billion Accounts More than 140 Million in the
http://semiocast.com/publications/2012_07_30_Twitter_
U.S.,
SEMIOCAST,
reaches_half_a_billion_accounts_140m_in_the_US (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
4. Published Cases: Involving Social Media Evidence (First Half 2012),
X1 DISCOVERY, http://www.x1discovery.com/social_media_cases.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). These numbers were gleaned from searching “online legal
databases of state and federal court decisions across the United States.” John
Patzakis, Mid-Year Report: Legal Cases Involving Social Media Rapidly Increasing, X1 DISCOVERY (July 23, 2012, 3:20 PM), http://blog.x1discovery.com/
2012/07/23/mid-year-report-legal-cases-involving-social-media-rapidly
-increasing/.
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involving social media because only about one percent of all
filed cases result in a published decision and many of the pub5
lished decisions involve fact patterns from as far back as 2008.
Accordingly, just as electronic communications have become an
important part of everyday life, these communications have also become essential to civil litigation.
The discovery of these electronic communications in civil
litigation is governed by, among other things, the Stored Com6
munications Act of 1986 (SCA). The current interpretation of
the SCA prevents email and social networking websites from
7
disclosing a user’s private messages in civil discovery. This approach limits the amount of available information in civil liti8
gation. As a result, some commentators have advocated for a
civil discovery exception to the SCA, allowing email and social
networking sites to fully disclose a user’s private messages in
9
civil discovery. This approach is consistent with the liberal
discovery approach taken by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce10
dure. However, allowing broad discovery of electronic information comes at a cost to both the court and to Internet service
11
providers. Therefore, in considering possible amendments to
5. Patzakis, supra note 4.
6. See generally, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding the SCA prohibits civil discovery of any email from an email service
provider).
8. See Ryan A. Ward, Note, Discovering Facebook: Social Network Subpoenas and the Stored Communications Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 563, 564
(2011) (explaining that users do not have access to all potentially relevant information regarding their social media accounts, however social media sites do
have access to this information).
9. See, e.g., Rudolph J. Burshnic, Note, Applying the Stored Communications Act to the Civil Discovery of Social Networking Sites, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1259, 1289–93 (2012).
10. The Supreme Court has indicated that FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), the
general discovery provision of the federal rules, “has been construed broadly to
encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other
matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (emphasis added). Further, since Oppenheimer was decided, the federal rules have been broadened to
allow discovery regarding any matter “relevant to any party’s claim or defense” instead of limiting discovery “relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action.” Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), with Oppenheimer, 437
U.S. at 350.
11. See generally, Patzakis, supra note 4 and accompanying text for the
amount of cases involving social media content. Allowing third party subpoenas in every single one of these cases would place a burden on these Internet
service providers and the courts administering these requests.
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the SCA legislators must be weigh the importance of broad discovery against the efficiency of obtaining that information.
This Note offers a solution to reconcile the competing val12
ues of efficiency and liberal discovery engendered by the SCA.
Part I introduces the SCA and its application to private Internet messages. Part II examines the different solutions for addressing the problems posed by the SCA in civil discovery. Finally, Part III recommends legislative reform to promote
efficiency in the discovery of private Internet messages. Specifically, this Note proposes that Congress amend the SCA to provide a clearer and more flexible definition for what constitutes
protected information and explicitly protect Internet service
providers from being required to respond to third party subpoenas in civil suits, but allow such information to be acquired
directly through the user.
I. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT’S APPLICATION
TO MODERN CIVIL DISCOVERY
This Part sets out an overview of the SCA and its application to civil discovery. First, this Part will introduce the SCA
with a particular focus on the statutory provisions relevant to
civil discovery. Next, it will briefly introduce the civil discovery
provisions at issue and discuss the application of the SCA to
email, social networking sites, and cloud computing services.
Then, this Part outlines some judicially created alternatives to
obtaining electronic communications in civil discovery. Finally,
this Part sets out a framework from which to analyze discovery
policy proposals.
A. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
The SCA was enacted as Title II of the Electronic Commu13
nications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986. The purpose of the
ECPA was to extend the codification of Fourth Amendment
protections to the world of electronic communication and re-

12. Privacy concerns are present during the process of electronic discovery
as well. This Note’s focus, however, is on the mechanisms of civil discovery and
how they affect the information flow of litigation. Volumes have been written
about user privacy as it relates to electronic discovery, for example, Rory Bahadur, Electronic Discovery, Informational Privacy, Facebook and Utopian
Civil Justice, 79 MISS. L.J. 317 (2009), which is outside the scope of this Note.
13. Pub. L. No. 99-508, §§ 201–202, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006)).

Vandelist_MLR

2014]

STATUS UPDATE

1539

14

mote computing. Congress saw a potential gap in Fourth
Amendment protection for information that would traditionally
be protected but for it being sent or stored on the Internet or on
15
a third party’s computers. Thus, in general, the SCA sought to
both limit third party Internet service providers’ ability to dis16
close a user’s’ information voluntarily and limit the power of
17
government investigators searching for electronic information.
Congress drafted the SCA to reflect the technological land18
scape of 1986. At this time, Internet users were primarily only
19
able to send and receive electronic mail and upload comments
20
to electronic bulletin boards. Further, some businesses con21
tracted out remote computing for data processing. Accordingly, only two types of Internet service providers are covered by
the SCA: electronic communications service (ECS) providers

14. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 16–19 (1986) (describing the purpose of
the ECPA as the codification of Fourth Amendment protections for emerging
technologies like electronic messaging); S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557 (identifying the potential lack of
Fourth Amendment protections typically provided for personal and business
information simply because that information is shared on computers).
15. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (noting that if electronic information “is subject to control by a third party computer operator, the information may be subject to no constitutional privacy protection”). Generally, information sent with
or stored on a third party Internet service provider is likely not covered by the
Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)
(“This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him
to Government authorities . . . .”); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1208, 1209–10 (2004) (indicating that because an Internet user’s communications come into contact with other third party computers the Fourth
Amendment does not protect such information).
A thorough analysis of electronic communications and the Fourth
Amendment is outside the scope of this Note. This sentence is merely provided
to offer a glimpse into the intentions of the legislators behind the ECPA.
16. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (noting that one of the purposes of the ECPA
was to prevent “wrongful use and public disclosure” of information stored electronically with third parties by “unauthorized private parties” indicating that
Congress intended to extend privacy protection to the private sphere, beyond
its traditional Fourth Amendment confines).
17. Ward, supra note 8, at 566.
18. William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1204–05
(2010) (arguing that instead of creating a flexible rule adaptable to changing
technology, Congress froze the SCA in 1986).
19. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986).
20. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22 (1986).
21. Id.
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and remote computing service (RCS) providers. Notably, the
SCA does not cover individuals or service providers that do not
23
qualify as ECS or RCS.
24
An email provider is a typical example of an ECS. An
ECS is “any service which provides to users thereof the ability
25
to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” Electronic communications include “any transfer of signs, signals,
26
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature.”
Moreover, the only ECS communications protected by the SCA
27
are those held in “electronic storage” by that service. Storage
of electronic information can mean temporary or intermediate
storage of an “electronic communication incidental” to its electronic transmission or storage of such communication for
28
“backup protection.”
An RCS is a provider “of computer storage or processing
29
services by means of an electronic communications system.”
An “electronic communications system” is facilities and equip30
ment used to transmit electronic communications. The RCS
category was meant to include services that performed out31
sourced data processing.
32
An ECS or RCS must offer its services to the public.
Therefore, while a commercial email service like AOL would be
considered offered to the public and therefore able to qualify as
an ECS or RCS, an employer’s internal email service would
33
not.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
23. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2707.
24. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1213; Ward, supra note 8, at 567.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
26. Id. § 2510(12).
27. Id. § 2702(a)(1).
28. Id. § 2510(17)(A)–(B).
29. Id. § 2711(2).
30. Id. § 2510(14).
31. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 19, 23 (1986) (explaining the technologies
covered by the ECPA, including remote computing services); S. REP. NO. 99541, at 8, 10–11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3562, 3564–65
(describing the advent of remote computing services in order to fully define the
statutory term).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(3) (prohibiting ECS and RCS entities serving “the public” from disclosing any person’s communications to any person,
entity, or government).
33. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1226. This distinction could exist because nonpublic accounts benefit the providers more than the users or because public
providers have less of an incentive to protect a user’s privacy rights, however,
the legislative intent is unclear as to the distinction. See id. at 1226–27. Ac-
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If an Internet service provider qualifies as either an ECS
or RCS, it may not disclose a user’s electronic communications
34
absent a search warrant. Although the SCA creates some
statutory exceptions to this rule, there are none that allow an
ECS or RCS to disclose a user’s information during the course
35
of civil discovery.
However, the SCA only protects the “content” of a user’s
36
electronic communications held by ECS and RCS providers.
Content is defined by the statute as “any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communica37
tion.” In contrast, non-content information is not protected by
38
the SCA. As an illustration, the body of an email is protected
by the SCA, whereas the name of the recipient and subject line
39
are not.
Congress did not contemplate how the SCA might apply to
civil discovery. The statutory language of the SCA does not
40
mention civil discovery. Similarly, the legislative history of
41
the ECPA is bereft of references to civil discovery. As a result,
cordingly, the relevant portions of the SCA do not apply to nonpublic providers.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (prohibiting ECS and RCS providers from voluntarily disclosing users’ information); 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)–(d) (exempting certain communications from SCA protection); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (providing
certain exceptions for compelled disclosure of users’ information held by an
ECS or RCS provider).
35. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711.
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a), 2703(a)–(b).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a), 2703(a)–(b).
39. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1228; see H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 23 (1986)
(clarifying that the records maintained by remote computing services have less
protection than the contents of those communications). For a discussion on
how traditional Fourth Amendment content and non-content protections apply
to new technology, compare Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: The Fourth
Amendment Protection Erodes as E-mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043,
1049–50 (2008), with David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying
Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud
Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, at 2229, 2233–39 (2009).
40. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12.
41. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647; S. REP. NO. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555; Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1986); Electronic Communication Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks,
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1006 (1985); 1984: Civil Liberties and
the National Security State: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1
(1984); Oversight on Communications Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
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courts are left with no guidance as to how the SCA applies to
civil discovery.
B. CIVIL DISCOVERY
Before analyzing how courts have applied the SCA to civil
electronic discovery disputes, it is important to introduce how
these cases end up in court. Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, parties can file a Rule 45 subpoena to command a
non-party to produce “documents, electronically stored infor42
mation, or tangible things.” These are commonly called sub43
poenas duces tecum. A subpoena duces tecum is the only tool
litigants have to compel nonparties to produce documents in a
44
civil case. The nonparty must produce the documents if they
45
are in that party’s “possession, custody, or control.” The nonparty can object to the subpoena through a motion to quash or
46
modify the subpoena.
In a typical case where the SCA is implicated in civil discovery, one of the litigants in a civil suit serves a subpoena
duces tecum on a company that transmits electronic messages,
47
such as Facebook. Then either the nonparty, or the opposing
party through an ex parte motion, files a motion to quash the
48
subpoenas under, among other things, the SCA. The court
then applies the SCA to Rule 45 and determines whether it
bans discovery of the electronically stored information.
C. APPLICATION OF THE SCA TO CIVIL DISCOVERY
Many courts have determined that the SCA bars civil discovery of a user’s electronic communications from an ECS or

on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. 1266 (1984); Surveillance, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 1 (1975); Surveillance, Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 675 (1975).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii).
43. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CIVIL § 2451 (3d ed. 2013).
44. Id. § 2456.
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii).
46. See id. at 45(c)(3).
47. See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969
(C.D. Cal. 2010).
48. See, e.g., id. at 969–70.
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49

RCS. Most of these courts prohibit such discovery because
there is no exception to the SCA allowing ECS or RCS providers to disclose a user’s information pursuant to a civil discovery
request and because there is no congressional intent indicating
50
otherwise. Therefore, courts are forced to classify Internet
service providers within the ECS or RCS categories in order to
determine whether the SCA prohibits civil discovery requests
served directly upon Internet service providers. Due to the immensity of technological change since 1986, it has been no easy
51
task applying the SCA to current technology. Making this
more complicated, some courts have held that a single service
must be either an ECS or an RCS, but others have held that a
52
single service can qualify as both an ECS and an RCS.
The SCA traditionally has been interpreted to cover email
providers. Courts have more recently applied the SCA to social
networking sites. However, the new technology challenging the
boundaries of SCA protection is cloud computing.
1. Email Providers
Courts agree that commercial email service providers, in
53
general, are considered ECS providers under the SCA. Specifically, it is generally understood that unopened emails are pro54
tected under the SCA. This is because the email communications are in “temporary, intermediate storage” incidental to
55
their transmission. However, much disagreement exists over
49. See, e.g., Bower v. Bower, 808 F. Supp. 2d 348, 349–51 (D. Mass.
2011); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC., 550 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611
(E.D. Va. 2008); O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 89 (Ct. App.
2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 196 F.R.D. 559, 561
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
50. See, e.g., Netscape, 196 F.R.D. at 561.
51. For example, in Crispin, the court labored over fifteen pages to determine the applicability of the ECS and RCS categories to email and social networking sites. 717 F. Supp. 2d at 976–91.
52. Compare Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 902–03
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a service provider can only be either an ECS or
an RCS), with Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 362 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
(holding that a service provider can be both an ECS and RCS).
53. See, e.g., Quon, 529 F.3d at 902–03 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79 (1st Cir. 2005); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d
1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004); Bower, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 349 (D. Mass. 2011).
54. See, e.g., Quon, 529 F.3d at 902–03; Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1077; United
States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771 (C.D. Ill. 2009); Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 246 (S.C. 2012).
55. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A)(2012)); accord Councilman, 418 F.3d at 72–79 (holding, after considering the text and
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whether an opened email is considered to be in “electronic stor56
age” and thus protected from civil discovery by the SCA.
Those arguing that opened emails should be considered to
be held in backup storage indicate that emails left on a commercial email provider’s servers, after a user downloads the
57
message onto her computer, are left there for backup reasons.
The principal rebuttal to this argument is that the backup provision definition of electronic storage should be narrowly interpreted as merely closing an “end-run” loophole around ECS
protections without which Internet service providers could disclose unopened backup copies created incident to transmis58
sion. However, some of the courts that have held opened messages do not fit within the ECS category have suggested those
59
same messages might constitute RCS content.
2. Social Networking Sites
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc. was the first published
60
case to apply the SCA to social media sites. The defendants
legislative history of the ECPA, that unread emails were meant to be protected under the SCA).
56. Compare, e.g., Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1077 (“[W]e think that prior access
is irrelevant to whether the messages at issue were in electronic storage.”),
and Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 n.2 (M.D.
Tenn. 2008) (holding that there is no difference between unopened and opened
emails under the SCA), with Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 771 (noting that read
emails have already been transmitted and are not stored for backup purposes,
and are therefore unprotected), and Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S.
Genetski, Criminal Discovery of Internet Communications Under the Stored
Communications Act: It’s Not a Level Playing Field, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 569, 580 (2007) (“[T]he Theofel court’s analysis is somewhat tortured.”).
57. See, e.g., Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (“An obvious purpose for storing a
message on an ISP’s server after delivery is to provide a second copy of the
message . . . .”); cf. Quon, 529 F.3d at 902–03 (holding that a text message service provider who permanently archived text messages on its servers was an
ECS because these were archived for backup reasons).
58. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1217 n.61; cf. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245
(“We question the reasoning expressed in Theofel that such passive inaction
can constitute storage for backup protection under the SCA . . . .”).
59. See, e.g., Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (indicating that Hotmail was
storing messages on a web-based email service “solely for the purpose of
providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber or customer” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2)(2012))); Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 247
n.3 (Toal, C.J., concurring) (noting that because an Internet service provider
can act as both an ECS and RCS, it might be the case that an email stored on
a web-based email system is protected under the RCS category).
60. 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 977 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Although some courts have
considered the SCA’s application to certain types of providers, none appears to
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served subpoenas duces tecum on Facebook and Myspace seek61
ing communications between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The plaintiff filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, arguing
62
that the subpoenas were in violation of the SCA. The court
first concluded that any private messaging on the social networking sites is protected from civil discovery under the ECS
63
category, similar to emails. Further, the court analogized
postings to a user’s Facebook wall or Myspace comments to the
restricted electronic bulletin board systems which Congress in64
tended to protect under the SCA. Therefore, it held that this
content renders Facebook and Myspace ECS providers, at least
to the extent that a Facebook or Myspace user restricts access
65
to his or her profile. In the alternative, the court held that this
content could also be considered an RCS service because the
66
communications were placed on the sites for storage purposes.
However, by implication, any Facebook wall postings or
Myspace comments generally available to the public would not
67
be protected by the SCA.
Similarly, Viacom International Inc. v. Youtube Inc. held
that an online service provider, YouTube, could not disclose a
user’s private videos uploaded to the site in the course of civil
discovery because such information was protected under the
68
RCS designation of the SCA. Without elaboration the court
indicated that YouTube qualified as an RCS because it provid69
ed “remote computing service to the public.”
3. Cloud Computing
There are no published cases available involving the SCA’s
application to cloud computing within the realm of civil discovery. However, the entire field of computer processing is starting
70
to shift to cloud computing. Therefore, once again, courts will
have addressed whether social-networking sites fall within the ambit of the
statute.”).
61. Id. at 968–69.
62. Id. at 969.
63. Id. at 980.
64. Id. at 981–89.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 990.
67. See id. at 991.
68. 253 F.R.D. 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
69. Id.
70. See Robison, supra note 18, at 1199–1200 (describing “the era of cloud
computing”).
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have to apply the ECS and RCS definitions to new technology.
Some suggest that cloud technology providers will not qualify
as ECS because “many of today’s popular cloud computing services are designed for purposes other than communication,
71
such as word processing.”
Some also suggest that cloud providers do not qualify as
RCS providers because many providers make revenue through
72
“contextual advertising.” This means the service providers release customer’ information to third-party advertising compa73
nies in order to facilitate tailored advertising. It is possible
this violates the RCS requirement that “‘storage or computer
processing’ be the sole reason that a customer transmits her
74
data to the cloud provider.”
Current case law prohibits Internet service providers from
disclosing a user’s private communications in the course of civil
discovery due to the SCA. However, as use of social media becomes more integrated in our daily lives, the SCA’s application
to civil discovery will become increasingly important.
D. ALTERNATIVES TO THE SCA IN CIVIL DISCOVERY
Serving a subpoena on a third party Internet service provider is not the only way electronic information can be discovered in civil cases. Some courts have elected to ignore the SCA
completely. And other courts have required parties to serve discovery requests on the user instead of on the service provider.
1. Ignore the SCA
There are at least two cases in which courts have ignored
the SCA’s application to civil discovery and allowed civil discovery subpoenas to be served directly upon Facebook and
75
Myspace. Commentators have criticized these opinions for
76
rendering decisions in discord with federal law.
71. Id. at 1209.
72. Id. at 1213–14.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1214. But see ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 144–45 (2010) (statement of Microsoft Corporation) (indicating that it views any cloud technologies
that allow for collaboration or interaction between users as ECS, and any time
the purpose of a program is to provide access to an application or remote storage of content it considers that program as an RCS).
75. See Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-cv-01958-WYD-MJW,
2009 WL 1067018 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009); Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907
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In Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court allowed a
subpoena to be served by the defendant upon Facebook,
Myspace, and Meetup.com for any relevant communications by
77
the plaintiff. Even though the application of the SCA was de78
bated in the parties’ briefs, in a two-page opinion, the court
did not address the SCA at all and merely concluded that the
information “is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
79
admissible evidence.”
Similarly, in Romano v. Steelcase Inc., the court granted
the defendant’s subpoena upon Facebook and Myspace seeking
80
access to the plaintiff’s accounts and deleted information. At
the outset of the opinion the court noted that it had considered
81
the SCA’s application to the discovery requests at issue. However, that is the only mention of the SCA throughout the entire
82
opinion. In granting the subpoenas, the court only substantively considered whether New York’s civil discovery rules
permitted the broad scope of discovery and whether the plaintiff had Fourth Amendment protection of her social media
83
posts.
2. Serve Discovery Request upon the User, not the Provider
84

As noted above, the SCA does not apply to individuals.
Therefore individuals can disclose any information traditionally
85
covered by the SCA. Many courts have taken advantage of
this exception to SCA protection and required the user of the
Internet service provider to produce information instead of diN.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
76. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 8, at 577.
77. Ledbetter, 2009 WL1067018, at *2.
78. Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Production of
Content of Social Networking Sites, Ledbetter, 2009 WL 1067018, 2009
WL3061763, at *4–5; Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant WalMart’s Motion to Compel Production of Content of Social Networking Sites,
Ledbetter, 2009 WL 1067018, 2009 WL 3061764 at *9; Wal-Mart’s Reply in
Support of Its Motion to Compel Production of Content of Social Networking
Sites, Ledbetter, 2009 WL 1067018, 2009 WL 3061765, at *2.
79. Ledbetter, 2009 WL 1067018, at *2.
80. Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
81. Id. at 652.
82. See id. passim.
83. See id. at 652–57.
84. See supra text accompanying note 23.
85. See, e.g., Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (D. Del. 1997)
(“[A] person who does not provide an electronic communication service . . . can
disclose or use with impunity the contents of an electronic communication unlawfully obtained from electronic storage.”).
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recting subpoenas upon the service providers. Most of these
courts recognize that the SCA most likely prohibits any requests directly on the Internet service providers and explicitly
87
recognize they are bypassing these restrictions.
E. COMPETING VALUES: EFFICIENCY AND LIBERAL DISCOVERY
Before identifying and analyzing the proposed modifications to the SCA, it is necessary to consider the policy choices at
stake. Any change in discovery rules implicates the competing
88
values of efficiency and liberal discovery. Liberal discovery
does not mean complete and errorless discovery, as this is im89
possible. Additionally, it is a waste of social resources, both in
terms of economics and time, to attempt to discover and analyze every shred of evidence that might be relevant to a particu90
lar case.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect this reality in
the very first rule, identifying that all of the rules should be interpreted in order to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
91
determination of every action and proceeding.” Similarly, the
86. See, e.g., Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1197167, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. April 5, 2012); In re Air Crash near Clarence Center, New York, on
February 12, 2009, 2011 WL 6370189, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011); EEOC
v. Simply Storage Mgmt. Servs., 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 2010); Flagg v.
City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Mackelprang v. Fidelity
Nat’l Title Agency of Nev., No. 2:06-CV-00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at
*6 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007); Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688,
at *6–7 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Nov. 8, 2011). But cf. J.T. Shannon Lumber Co. v. Gilco
Lumber Inc., 2008 WL 4755370, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 29, 2008) (holding that
allowing a court to compel a defendant to consent to release information protected by the SCA would be an “end run around the [SCA],” though hinting
that the plaintiff could serve a discovery request directly on the defendant to
obtain the protected information).
87. See, e.g., Glazer, 2012 WL 1197167, at *3 (requiring the plaintiff to
produce electronically stored information in order to bypass SCA issues);
Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *8 (“The proper method for obtaining such
information, however, is to serve upon Plaintiff limited requests for production
of relevant [Myspace] communications.”).
88. Compare Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 747, 749 (1998) (lauding the benefits of broad discovery measures), with
James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV.
17, 17 (1997) (identifying the perils of inefficient discovery).
89. See Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal
Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287, 302 (2010) (stating that in discovery “perfect
accuracy is impossible”).
90. Id.
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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rules explicitly reject complete and errorless discovery for electronic information, providing that parties do not have to produce electronic information that would result in “undue burden
92
or cost.” Therefore, the policy battle between liberal discovery
and efficiency is not waged at the extremes. Rather, the ongoing argument is within the bounds of the current rules and how
broadly or narrowly the discovery provisions should be inter93
preted.
Those arguing for a broad interpretation of the federal discovery provisions prioritize “just” over “speedy” and “inexpen94
sive” in rule one. These scholars point to the benefits liberal
discovery has provided to the justice system since its introduc95
tion in 1938. For example, some argue that liberal discovery
rules have expanded substantive law in areas where it is often
96
hard to prove claims, such as disparate treatment cases.
Moreover, broad discovery is an important procedural mechanism available because it informs all parties of the merits of
controversies and therefore allows for the “administration of
97
justice.”
In contrast, those arguing for efficient discovery emphasize
that “just” outcomes are only available if litigation is “speedy”
98
and “inexpensive.” Congress endorsed this position when it
enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which was rooted
in the concern that civil litigants were denied access to justice
due to inefficiencies and delay of the courts as a result of the
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
93. See Bone, supra note 89, at 300 (explaining that judges have broad
discretion to interpret Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 as a broadening or narrowing provision
of the rest of the Federal Rules).
94. Cf. id. at 293–95 (noting that pre-1970’s judges applied rule one to “to
support liberal interpretations of the discovery rules”).
95. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 697
(1998) (holding that liberal discovery has largely eliminated situations where
“the merits of controversies are imperfectly understood by the parties, are inadequately presented to the courts, and too often fail to exert a controlling influence upon the final judgment”).
96. Marcus, supra note 88, at 749–52.
97. Subrin, supra note 95, at 697; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2239 (1989) (“[B]road access to document repositories is the most powerful weapon in the Rules discovery armory . . . .”).
98. E.g., Bone, supra note 89, at 299 (“Sometimes . . . judges emphasize
Rule 1’s reference to ‘speedy’ and ‘inexpensive,’ but sometimes they focus on
achieving ‘just’ determinations, arguing that a party’s fear of excessive cost
and delay can impede court access and produce unjust outcomes.”).
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99

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These scholars argue the introduction of mass quantities of electronically stored information has furthered the need to focus on efficiency because
parties “cannot reasonably expect to obtain all electronically
stored information” through discovery when there are terabytes
100
of possibly relevant information available.
* * *
The current interpretation of the SCA in civil discovery is
an outmoded application of an outdated law. It does not correctly balance the values of efficiency and liberal discovery. In
recognition of its failures, many commentators have proposed
modifications to the SCA.
II. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE SCA
Due to the anachronistic ECS and RCS definitions, the inconsistency of SCA application, and general uncertainty that
the SCA has engendered in civil discovery, there have been
many proposed modifications to the current application of the
SCA. Each of these modifications should be analyzed to determine whether they strike the correct balance between efficiency
and justice. The first proposed modification would have courts
apply the Federal Rules of Civil Discovery and then correctly
apply the SCA. The second proposed modification would simplify ECS and RCS categories. Finally, a proposed civil discovery
exception would eviscerate SCA protection for civil litigants.
None of these approaches strikes the right balance between efficiency and justice.
A. RETAIN THE STATUS QUO
One proposed modification to the SCA is not a modification
101
at all, but merely a continuance of the status quo. Under this
approach, courts should first apply the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to screen civil discovery subpoenas seeking infor99. Kakalik et al., supra note 88, at 17.
100. See Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to
Cutting and Shifting the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 85 (2007) (“The days when the requesting
party can expect to ‘get it all’ and the producing party to produce whatever
they feel like producing are long gone.” (quoting Hopson v. Mayor & City
Council of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 245 (D. Md. 2005))).
101. See Ward, supra note 8, at 581–88.
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mation from Internet service providers for overbreadth and
102
admissibility. Then, courts should apply the SCA to determine whether the service providers qualify for ECS or RCS pro103
tection. This modification is both unjust and inefficient within the meaning of rule one.
The status quo approach does not satisfy the “just” requirement of rule one for two reasons. First, the current approach does not allow for full and complete discovery of information stored online because the SCA protects any information
that qualifies as ECS or RCS from civil discovery with no ex104
ception.
Although some of this information is available
105
through the user, users can only supply screenshots of their
content, which are not searchable by the requesting party, and
106
users often do not have access to their deleted data. Thus,
there is a portion of information that is wholly undiscoverable
in civil litigation regardless of its importance to the claims or
defenses at issue. As a result, the status quo could create a situation where the merits of a controversy would be “imperfectly
107
understood” and “inadequately presented to the court[].” This
is the precise situation rule one’s “just” requirement and Rule
twenty-six’s liberal discovery provisions were designed to
108
avoid.
Second, one of the foundations of the American legal sys109
tem is consistent adjudication for similarly situated parties.
102. Id. at 582–84. Under the rules, a discovery request must be “relevant
to any party’s claim or defense” and must be “reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
103. Ward, supra note 8, at 584–88.
104. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
105. See supra Part I.C.2.
106. See Ward, supra note 8, at 564.
107. Subrin, supra note 95, at 697.
108. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
109. William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949)
(“[T]here will be no equal justice under law if a negligence rule is applied in
the morning but not in the afternoon.”); Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J.
2031, 2039 (1996) (“Such justifications of stare decisis include the notions that
the rule allows for advantageous predictability in the ordering of private conduct, that it promotes the necessary perception that law is stable and relatively unchanging, that it prevents frustration of private expectations, that it
serves the resource-saving goal of judicial efficiency, and even that it preserves
the separation of powers by enforcing judicial restraint.”); Justice Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178
(1989) ( “[O]ne of the most substantial . . . competing values [in adjudication],
which often contradicts the search for perfection, is the appearance of equal
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This foundation is upheld through liberal discovery rules that
110
reduce the uncertainty of judicial outcomes. However, the
current judicial interpretation of the SCA applies its protection
inconsistently across similarly situated parties when they are
seeking to discover email communications, and some courts
111
even refuse to apply its protections at all. Consistent adjudication is not ensured through consistent liberal discovery in a
system that inconsistently admits electronically stored information.
Additionally, the current application of the SCA is inefficient for two reasons, both of which result from out of date ECS
112
and RCS definitions. First, judges have to jump through analytical hoops to apply the anachronistic ECS and RCS defini113
tions to current technology.
Judicial wrangling with the
SCA’s definitions in civil discovery diverts the attention of
judges from deciding on the merits of the cases before them to
applying obsolete definitions to new technology in order to determine whether a piece of information is to be protected from
civil discovery. This unnecessarily delays the adjudication of
cases because judges are forced to rule on these protective or114
ders before even considering the merits of the case.
treatment. As a motivating force of the human spirit, that value cannot be
overestimated.”).
110. See Subrin, supra note 95, at 697 (“[A] large part of the uncertainty in
the outcome [of trials] result[s] from the want of information on the part of litigants and their counsel as to the real nature of the respective claims and the
facts upon which they rest” (quoting Edson Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE
RAGLAND JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL iii (1932))).
111. See supra Parts I.B, I.C.1.
112. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 21, 139–40 (2010) (statement of Richard Salgado, Law Enforcement and Security Counsel, Google Inc.) (arguing that the
ECPA is out of date and has thus resulted in much confusion as to what is protected and what is not and noting that Gmail is at times an ECS, at times an
RCS, but as for everything else was “largely unanticipated in 1986 when
ECPA was passed, and determining whether a particular piece of information
held by Google for any one of those services is held as an ECS or RCS is no
trivial task”); id. at 143 (Response to post hearing questions from Mike Hintze,
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Microsoft Corporation) (“Technology has changed drastically since ECPA was enacted in 1986. It was not possible at that time to contemplate the manner and extent of the changes that have occurred in the 24
years since the ECS and RCS definitions were drafted. Technological changes,
coupled with the rather ambiguous definitions, create significant challenges
for online service providers in determining the appropriate classification for
their services.”).
113. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
114. E.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC., 550 F. Supp. 2d 606,

Vandelist_MLR

2014]

STATUS UPDATE

1553

Second, the uncertainty surrounding the SCA’s application
to civil discovery has diverted social resources away from service providers’ income-producing lines of business to the legal
departments. While not necessarily inefficient within the
meaning of rule one, it misallocates economic resources. This
diversion takes place because service providers are unsure as to
what they can disclose and what they must protect, especially
115
with new technologies like cloud computing. The diversion of
resources also occurs when judges grant third party subpoenas
116
to obtain a user’s information from Internet service providers.
The advocates of this approach alleged that it is a “uniform
approach to discovery requests” for electronically stored infor117
mation. Also, these proponents argue that applying the rules
first will quash many third party subpoenas before the SCA is118
sues are even considered. As noted above, many of the current problems with the SCA’s application to civil discovery are
a result of the inconsistent and complicated application to new
technology; thus, a uniform approach to discovery requests of
electronically stored information is something to strive for.
However, both of these alleged benefits avoid the root problems
of the SCA. It does not take into account the reduction of available information in discovery or the inefficiencies it engenders
in the judicial process and the overall economy. Therefore, a
more holistic solution should strive for uniformity of application to electronic civil discovery requests, like this proposed solution, but it must also attempt to eradicate the underlying issues with the SCA.

611 (E.D. Va. 2008).
115. E.g., ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 21, 139–40 (2010) (Response to post
hearing questions from Richard Salgado, Law Enforcement and Security
Counsel, Google Inc.) (arguing that Gmail can be both an ECS and an RCS at
different times, but most current technology could not have been anticipated
by the 1986 ECPA); id. at 143–45 (Response to post hearing questions from
Mike Hintze, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Microsoft Corporation) (describing the
complicated, confusing, and laborious process for determining whether technologies like geolocation, social networking, and online calendars qualify for
ECS or RCS protection).
116. Cf. Kakalik et al., supra note 88, at 30 (explaining the costs of early
case management).
117. Ward, supra note 8, at 581.
118. See id. at 582–84.
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B. COLLAPSE THE ECS AND RCS DISTINCTION
In order to remedy the inconsistencies that result from the
archaic ECS and RCS definitions, some suggest collapsing the
119
two categories into one. This remedy would eliminate the distinction between service providers and instead shift the focus to
120
whether individual files are protected. Under this reform, the
SCA would apply to all “network service providers” but keep
the ECS and RCS distinction for files in order to preserve the
121
differing legal standards for criminal investigations.
One
commentator further suggests that social networking sites
should be explicitly included in the definition of “network ser122
vice provider” in accordance with the Crispin decision.
This modification to the SCA makes important strides towards justice and efficiency in the discovery of information
stored online. Providing a more general and flexible definition
for Internet service providers will simplify the statute and reduce confusion as to which providers are covered under the cur123
rent ECS and RCS definitions. This broad definition is important going forward because it is flexible enough to cover a
broad range of developing technologies, such as cloud compu124
ting. Providing clarity of coverage to courts will increase effi125
ciency during the discovery process and also produce more
126
consistent protections across media platforms.
However, this remedy is no panacea. It still retains the
outdated ECS and RCS definitions for civil discovery purposes,
127
merely shifting the focus from service providers to files. As
stated above, retaining these definitions, in general, would re119. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1235; Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–89.
120. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1235; Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–89.
121. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1235; Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–89. For
an explanation of how the ECPA applies to criminal investigations, see generally Kerr, supra note 15, at 1218–33.
122. Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288; see also supra text accompanying
notes 60–67.
123. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1235; Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–89.
124. For an explanation of the problems the ECS and RCS categories pose
for cloud providers, see Part I.B.3.
125. See Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288 (“It would also promote judicial
economy; courts, like the one in Crispin, would no longer have to unnecessarily labor over the ECS/RCS distinction.”).
126. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1233 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the ECS and RCS categories is in conflict with the traditional
understanding of the two categories and that simplification of the definition is
necessary to remedy this conflict).
127. See Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–89.
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sult in unjust outcomes due to the limitations on liberal discovery and inconsistent outcomes and would increase judicial and
128
economic inefficiencies. Therefore, it does not effectively reform the confusion that the definitions engender.
Moreover, adding social networking sites to the definition
of a “network service provider” would repeat the same mistakes
of the current ECPA, namely that it would codify privacy protections based on the technological landscape of today instead
of drafting a broad and flexible rule to apply to present and fu129
ture technology. Some might say that this argument could attach to any legislation regulating technology; in other words,
any legislation written today could be rendered outdated by de130
velopments in technology. While it is true that any law written today is hampered by our present assumptions regarding
technology, the more narrow the definition as to what is protected by the SCA, the more likely it is to become outdated. For
example, if Internet users stopped using social networking
sites, just like users stopped using electronic bulletin boards,
this part of the definition would be rendered obsolete. But if the
definition included all Internet service providers, the definition
would only be rendered obsolete if people stopped using the Internet. Thus, while this remedy makes significant strides, it
falls short of breaking through the shackles of the 1986 ECS
and RCS definitions.
C. PROVIDE A CIVIL DISCOVERY EXCEPTION
A more holistic change to the SCA would be to add a civil
discovery exception thereby permitting subpoenas to be served
131
directly upon Internet service providers.
Under this approach, proposed by Professors Zwillinger and Genetski, a civil
litigant could petition the court to disclose the information protected by the SCA by showing it is relevant and unavailable
132
from other sources. If the request is granted, the court would
give the service provider notice and an opportunity to “quash or
128. See supra notes 104–16 and accompanying text.
129. For an explanation of the technological landscape of 1986, see supra
notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race
to Keep up with Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239,
275 (2007) (describing that “future-proofing” technology is difficult because
“the path of technological change is clouded in mystery”).
131. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 56, at 597–98; Burshnic, supra
note 9, at 1289–92.
132. Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 56, at 597.
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modify” the order if the information sought “would cause an
133
undue burden on such provider.” If the order is granted, the
service provider is entitled to cost reimbursement incurred
134
through the production from the requesting party.
This approach provides for more liberal discovery and
therefore satisfies the interests of justice in rule one. It allows
civil litigants the opportunity to discover all relevant electronic
information by lifting the veil of SCA protection. For instance,
if a user did not have access to relevant information because
the user deleted it or deactivated her account, this procedural
amendment would allow such information to be discovered
from the service provider. In some lawsuits, such information
could be essential to merits of the controversy and to the “ad135
ministration of justice.”
This proposal, however, fails to remedy the ECS and RCS
definitions and therefore will result in inconsistent application
136
of the cost-shifting burden explained above. The question of
whether electronically stored information is covered by these
proposed procedures is still subject to the outdated ECS and
RCS definitions that create unjustly inconsistent outcomes and
137
judicial and economic inefficiency.
Still, as a general matter this modification strikes a reasonable balance between justice and efficiency because of its
cost-shifting mechanism. Typically, the responding party pays
138
for any production costs related to discovery. Thus, it is likely
if there was a wholesale discovery exception to the SCA with no
statutory requirement to cost-shift, the responding party would
139
have to pay for the service provider’s production expenses.
There are some procedures that would allow the responding
party to cost-shift for the production of electronically stored in133. Id. at 598.
134. Id.
135. Subrin, supra note 95, at 697. But see Mazza, supra note 100, at 98
(“[D]ecisions on motions regarding who will be required to pay for discovery
responses (the cost of which may run into the hundreds of thousands, if not
tens of millions, of dollars) can impact severely how an action proceeds and in
fact may be outcome-determinative in some cases.”).
136. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 56, passim.
137. See supra notes 104–16 and accompanying text.
138. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)
(“[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of
complying with discovery requests . . . .”).
139. See id. But see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (providing that parties need
not produce electronic information that would result in “undue burden or
cost”).
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formation that is “not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost,” though the specifics of cost-shifting rules are
jurisdiction-specific and constantly in flux, and it is unclear if
140
such information would qualify under these standards. Consequently, if there were a civil discovery exception that didn’t
require cost-shifting, requesting parties would likely always request information directly from the social networking site because they have an incentive to gather complete information
141
and no economic disincentive.
This proposed modification
would allow complete discovery of electronic information only
when a requesting party believes the information likely to be
produced outweighs the cost. This will necessarily reduce unnecessary litigation costs.
* * *
While none of the proposals above strike the right equilibrium between justice and efficiency, there are features of each
proposal that can be incorporated into a balanced solution to
amend the SCA. Any amendment to the SCA should attempt to
create a uniform approach to requesting electronically stored
information in civil discovery. Further, broadening the category
of information covered by the SCA will reduce current confusion as to what information is covered and help ensure the legislation is not rendered obsolete through future changes in
technology. Finally, providing a cost-shifting provision for information that is difficult to reach would strike the right balance between justice and efficiency.
III. A BALANCED PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE SCA
As evidenced by the problems with the status quo, the SCA
needs to be amended in order to provide consistent application
across current and future technologies. In order to render SCA
protection in civil discovery explicit and not merely implied,
legislators should amend the SCA to contain a civil discovery
provision that incorporates three features. First, this provision
140. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see also Mazza, supra note 100, at 99
(“[T]he law on shifting the cost of producing ESI remains jurisdiction-specific,
often unsettled, sometimes conflicting, and continually evolving.”).
141. For example, in disparate treatment cases often plaintiffs must find
evidence of a “smoking gun” in order to prove liability, which incentivizes
plaintiffs to obtain as much information as possible. See Marcus, supra note
88, at 749–50.

1558

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:1536

ought to include a broad definition of protected information in
order to reduce judicial and economic inefficiencies. Second, the
amendment should retain and codify the user exception. Third,
the amendment should allow for information rendered inaccessible by the SCA to be discovered through the service provider
if the requesting party pays the responding party’s costs. Such
an amendment would satisfy both the interests of justice and
efficiency.
A. BROADEN THE DEFINITION OF PROTECTED INFORMATION
Enlarging the scope of SCA protection through a broader
definition of protected information will increase efficiency in
the discovery of information stored online. The current ECS
and RCS definitions are obsolete and result in judicial and eco142
nomic inefficiencies. The problem with the current definitions
is that they were written to reflect the technological landscape
of the day and not drawn broadly to adapt to new technolo143
gies. The proposal to collapse the ECS and RCS is limited by
the fact that it merely transfers the outmoded definitions to
144
files. To avoid this pitfall, a broad catchall definition should
be drafted for electronic information stored on the Internet.
The categories of ECS and RCS providers should be aban145
doned in favor of a single network service provider category.
Under the SCA, the definition of a “network service provider”
should be broad enough to encompass all present and future
technologies that transmit information over the Internet. The
statutory definition of a “network service provider” should be
any Internet service provider that provides services to users.
There should also be a note of statutory interpretation in the
statute that makes clear that this definition is to be broadly
construed. The broad definition coupled with this note of statutory interpretation will encompass all present and foreseeable
future Internet service providers.
This definition of a network service provider is admittedly
broad and somewhat vague. However, this is by design. A broad
definition of what is covered will allow the SCA’s new civil discovery provision to adapt to the changing technological tides
142. See supra notes 113–30 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 18–23, 51, 112 and accompanying text.
144. See supra Part II.B.
145. This is the same approach advocated for by Orin Kerr and Rudolph
Burshnic. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1235; Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–
89.
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and will avoid the current problem of fitting new technologies
into old definitions. Also, the definition should not include a list
of examples as to what is covered because then the statute
146
would fall prey to the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. This canon
of construction interprets a general word to be read in accord147
ance with the specific terms listed in a series. Thus, the practical effect of including a list of electronic communications covered by the civil discovery amendment would be to lock the
definition into the technologies of today instead of allowing it to
adapt to the technologies of tomorrow.
Cloud computing provides an illustrative example of how
148
this new definition would work. If a user, Joe Briefcase, performed most of his computing in an Internet cloud provided by
Microsoft (e.g., word processing, spreadsheets, email communications) Microsoft would be completely covered by the new definition of “network service provider” because it is providing
services to Joe Briefcase. This is true even if Joe stores some of
this information on his computer’s hard drive because the
manner in which Joe stores his information does not change
the fact that Microsoft is providing him Internet services. Also,
this is a moot point due to the user exception to be discussed
below. If Joe stores his information locally on his computer, discovery can be requested through him and not Microsoft.
In addition to broadening the definition of what service
providers are covered, the new statute should abolish the current statute’s heightened protection for service providers that
149
offer their services to the public. There is no legislative histo150
ry in support of this distinction and the two proffered reasons
for the distinction by commentators no longer accord with reali-

146. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (“[A] word is
known by the company it keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a sociis).”); Beecham
v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994) (“That several items in a list share
an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing
that attribute as well.”).
147. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575; Beecham, 511 U.S. at 371.
148. Joe Briefcase is a fictional character created by David Foster Wallace
in his essay E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction that appears in A
SUPPOSEDLY FUN THING I’LL NEVER DO AGAIN 39 (1997).
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(3) (2006) (prohibiting ECS and RCS entities serving “the public” from disclosing any person’s communications to any
person, entity, or government).
150. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1226 (explaining that the legislative history is
not clear about why only ECS and RCS providers that offer services to the
public are covered).
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151

ty. One of the reasons offered for the distinction is that nonpublic providers of services, like a university email system, are
for the benefit of the provider—the university—and not the user and, therefore, the user’s information should not be protect152
ed. However, it cannot be said that public accounts are only
for the benefit of the user because Internet service providers to
the public are for profit entities that see the users as benefiting
153
the provider. A second reason presented for the current distinction between public and private is that nonpublic providers
have more of an incentive to not disclose their user’s information because they have a “long-term, multifaceted relationship with their users” whereas public providers only see users
154
as a source of revenue. However, this is a distinction without
a difference because in civil discovery a third party’s incentive
to protect user’s privacy does not matter; the only thing that
matters is the legal tools available to protect that privacy. Further, service providers that offer services to the public have just
as much of an incentive to protect privacy because privacy
155
breaches have a negative impact on a company’s bottom line.
Some might also argue that this new definition is overly
broad and places too much emphasis on efficiency. After all,
this definition applies to limit third party discovery requests
from all present and future Internet service providers. Accordingly, the new statute could protect highly relevant material
simply because it is stored online. However, as noted below,
there still remains a user exception and a cost-shifting option to
obtain information stored with these service providers.
Therefore with this new definition, judges, lawyers, and
service providers would no longer have to fit the square peg of
current and new technologies into the round ECS and RCS
holes, thereby increasing efficiency of the entire discovery process.

151. For an explanation of these two rationales, see id. at 1226–27.
152. Id.
153. E.g., Robison, supra note 18, at 1213–14 (describing how cloud computing companies use contextual advertising to drive revenues).
154. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1227.
155. See Alessandro Acquisti, et al., Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches?
An Event Study, Workshop on the Economics of Information Security 1, 12
(2006), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti
-friedman-telang-privacy-breaches.pdf (finding a statistically significant negative relationship between privacy breaches and a company’s market value).
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B. RETAIN THE USER EXCEPTION TO THE SCA
Retaining the user exception to the SCA will strike the correct balance between efficiency and liberal discovery. Serving
civil discovery requests on the user instead of the provider is
the “easiest and most efficient way to conduct” discovery of
156
electronically stored information. This is because a user is
more familiar with where responsive information is available
157
than the service provider, service providers would incur third
158
party legal fees if subpoenas were granted, and it is drastically more expensive for a provider to preserve all possible relevant information for all of its users’ ongoing civil litigation than
159
for a user to preserve such information. Additionally, retaining the user exception to the SCA allows for full and liberal discovery. All information that a user has legal access to can be
discovered through a rule thirty-four request directly on the
160
user.
The user exception to the SCA should be codified in the civil discovery amendment in order to make it explicit to the
courts and litigants that this is the most reasonably accessible
tool for discovering electronically stored information. The statutory language should read: “This statute does not apply to legally valid civil discovery requests served upon an Internet service provider’s user.” Although many courts have noted that
161
this exception is inherent in the statute, some litigants do not
162
use it and other courts have not recognized it. Therefore, in
156. Megan Uncel, Note, “Facebook Is Now Friends with the Court”: Current Federal Rules and Social Media Evidence, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 43, 58
(2011). For an example of the costs of such third party subpoenas, see supra
note 116 and accompanying text.
157. Cf. Mazza, supra note 100, at 19 (“The ‘cost and time required to have
legal professionals read documents closely’ for responsiveness, privilege, and
other confidentiality concerns, especially ‘in the context of cases involving
hundreds of thousands (or even millions) of pages of records, can be astronomical.’”) (internal citations omitted).
158. See id.; supra note 116 and accompanying text.
159. See Mazza, supra note 100, at 30 (“Once the scope of a litigation hold
has been determined, it is up to a party and its counsel to take reasonable
steps to see that sources of information within the scope are located and actually placed on hold during implementation.”).
160. See Uncel, supra note 156, at 58 (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34
grants parties the opportunity to discover evidence that is within the responding party’s ‘possession, custody, or control.’”). Any information a user can access from her account is discoverable through this rule. Id.
161. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
162. For examples of court decisions not discussing the user exception but
applying the SCA to protect information stored on the Internet, see United
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order to increase efficiency, the user exception should be codified to give clear guidance to courts and litigants.
It could be argued that retaining only the user exception to
the SCA and not providing any discovery through the provider
163
possibly eliminates much discoverable information. There is a
risk of spoliation whereby a user could delete any responsive
164
information once litigation commences. However, this risk
can be sufficiently reduced by supplementing discovery requests with document protection orders and through the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which suggest that it is unethical for a lawyer to assist or counsel in the “destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence that is relevant to a legal pro165
ceeding” or in foreseeable litigation. This approach does leave
open the possibility that a shrewd client might destroy im166
portant information without the lawyer’s counsel. This narrow loophole can be closed through the cost-shifting discovery
mechanism discussed below.
C. PROVIDE A COST-SHIFTING CIVIL DISCOVERY EXCEPTION
Providing a cost-shifting mechanism that would allow litigants to obtain information otherwise unavailable is in the best
interests of justice. As noted above, the Zwillinger and Genetski
procedure for obtaining this information is a good model for
how to add a cost-shifting discovery exception. This proposal
would allow a civil litigant to obtain information from an Internet service provider if that litigant showed the information was
relevant and unavailable from other sources, if that litigant
paid for the other party’s costs, and if it did not result in undue
167
burden or cost upon the service provider.
Though, there
should be one addition to Zwillinger and Genetski’s amendStates v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359
F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004); Bower v. Bower, 808 F. Supp. 2d 348 (D. Mass.
2011); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal.
2010); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Youtube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
163. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 8, at 564 (noting that users often do not
have access to their deleted data).
164. See Uncel, supra note 156, at 53 (“For example, in the context of social
media evidence, spoliation issues often go hand in hand with party requests.
There is a legitimate risk ‘that the witness will erase all the comments from
his [social networking profile] immediately upon receiving’ the request.”) (internal citations omitted).
165. Id. at 57–58 (internal citations omitted).
166. See id. at 58 (“A stealthy client thus could delete his social media profile without legal penalty.”).
167. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
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ment. The responding party should have to pay for the costs of
producing any information that was deleted, altered, or concealed after the time when litigation was filed, threatened, or
168
reasonably foreseeable. There should be a safe harbor exception for information that is lost by the service provider as a result of the “routine, good-faith operation of an electronic infor169
mation system.”
This would provide an added disincentive for spoliation
and provide equity in cost shifting. In addition to the current
170
sanctions for failing to preserve evidence, a party that intentionally spoils evidence would have to pay for the costs of restoring that evidence. This is in accordance with fundamental
notions of equity as well because a party that spoils evidence
should not benefit by shifting the cost of producing that evidence onto the other party.
Some might argue that this fails to meet the rule one requirement of being “just” because cost-shifting can sometimes
171
be cost-prohibitive and therefore dispositive. However, dispositive cost-shifting usually only occurs when there are largescale requests for terabytes of information costing millions of
172
dollars. Although the use of online communications is in173
creasing, it is not likely to be the case that these requests will
174
result in prohibitively large amounts of data.
168. Accord AM. BAR ASS’N, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE 5 (Daniel F. Gourash
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“Generally, no duty to preserve evidence arises before
litigation is filed, threatened, or reasonably foreseeable . . . .”).
169. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
170. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 168, at 54–78 (describing a
district court’s broad discretionary authority to impose sanctions including an
adverse inference, default judgment, or fines and penalties).
171. See Mazza, supra note 100, at 98 (“[D]ecisions on motions regarding
who will be required to pay for discovery responses (the cost of which may run
into the hundreds of thousands, if not tens of millions, of dollars) can impact
severely how an action proceeds and in fact may be outcome-determinative in
some cases.”).
172. See id.
173. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
174. For example, as of 2012 Gmail only allows users to store 10 GB of data, Picasa allows users to store 1 GB of pictures and videos, and AOL allows
the preservation of 9,000 emails. Free Storage Limits, GOOGLE, http://support
.google.com/picasa/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=1224181 (last visited Mar.
10, 2014); Message: My Mailbox Is Full, AOL, http://help.aol.com/help/
microsites/microsite.do?cmd=displayKC&docType=kc&externalId=220725
(last visited Mar. 10, 2014); Your Storage Limit, GOOGLE GMAIL, http://support
.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6558 (last visited Mar. 10,
2014).
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CONCLUSION
The SCA has outlived its usefulness in the area of civil discovery. The current application of the SCA creates inconsistent
protection, inefficiency in civil discovery, and limits the amount
of discoverable information. In order to strike the right balance
between efficiency and justice, legislators should add a civil
discovery amendment to the SCA that broadens the definition
of protected information, codifies the user exception, and allows
for a cost-shifting discovery provision.

